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LLOYD 8ONFIELD

The role of seigneurial jurisdiction
after the Norman Conquest and the nature
of customary law in medieval England

Introduction
Our task in producing this volume in comparative legal history i.s to place the
seigneurial or feudal courts within their jurisdictional context, as one or a variety
or courts available to litigants during the middle age.s and beyond, and to describe
their procedures and the substantive principles or law therein applied. One object
of the English legal historians engaged in our comparative study is to .set out the
jurisdictional boundaries or the various courts of medieval England. Because tho.se
who sought to resolve disputes in medieval England had an array or courts from
which to choose, discussion is necc.ssarily complex. ln particular_ we must consider
the extent to which feudal courts survived in the later middle ages. a period described by historians as that of the 'centrali1ation of justice.' 1 one in which the
royal courts expanded their subject matter jurisdiction. arguably at the expense of
other courts.
A second purpose or our inquiry is to illuminate the procedure.s employed in
feudal courts, and, to the extent 1xis,ible. set out the ,uhstantive principles that rc,olvcd disputes between parties who brought cases to feudal courts. In this report, I
shall consider the nature of custom in one feudal jurisdiction: the manor court. A
triad of questions regarding manorial custom will be addressed: in what records
can custom he round; what wa.s the legal nature or cu.stom; and from what .sou1-ces
was it derived. Once again the royal courts provide the basis for comparison. Lngli.sh legal hi.storians frequently contemplate the.se three issues by con.sidering the
extent to which feudal courts followed common law court.s with respect to both
2
procedure and substantive law.
1 Sec for example S. f,: C. Milso111. flistorical Foundations of the Common Law. 2'" 1 ed.
( 1981 ). ch. I: and R. C. \lu11 Coe11cgn11. The Birth or the English Common I .aw, ( I 9T.l). ch. I.

2 Sec the debate on this question between P,111/ Urn111.1· (.. What did Edwardian Villagers
Understand hy Law·' .. ) and myself. Uowl 1!011/ielcl (What did English Villagers mean by
Customary Law) in J'.1·i Ro;i and R. M. S111it/1 c:ds. Mcdic:val Society and the Manor Court
(19%).
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We shall begin with a ,ketch of the jurisdictions available to litigants in the middle age,. The specialist legal historian, particularly one or England, will recognize
that the exposition is both incomplete and idiosyncratic; its purpose is to assist our
continental colleagues in understanding the piece that was the feudal court within
the broader jurisdictional pu1.1.le or the medieval legal order. llaving done so, we
shall turn to a consideration or the nature or custom in the manor court.

The jurisdictional puzzle
Let us comrncncc with a discussion or the various courts available to litigants by
noting the jurisdictional boundaries which obtained between courts.1 A useful way
to begin is by rdcrring to a charter or decree issued during the reign of Henry 1
( 1100 - 35) that set out the manner or holding the shire and hundred courts. One
,ection or the charter is devoted to the di,tribution or jurisdiction between courts.
Three different courts arc enumerated: the royal court; the shire court; and the
seigneurial (the lord's) court, and the allocation ofjurisdietion is as follows:
And if henceforth a case arising concerning the division or occupation of lands -- if it is
between crown barons of rninc the case shall he dealt with in rny court ... and if it is between the vassals of a crown baron of mine, the case shall be dealt with in their lord's court
1
. and if it is between vassal<, or two lords it shall he d_ealt with in the county cour1.·

It should he noted that the charter docs not appear to set up a hierarchy or courts
with the royal court at the helm; rather, the appropriate forum for the resolution or
a dispute seems to depend largely on feudal tics and an clement of practicality.
Controversies between vassals or the same lord, be he- king or baron, arc to be
heard in the court of their lord; in circumstances where the adversaries share no
common lord, the dispute must go to the shire court.
The extent to which the di,tribution of judicial authority set out in the decree
was an ideal as opposed to a reality can not be ascertained. Ir a dcmandant brought
his case in the 'wrong' court, but the ddendant was prepared to have the claim
resolved therein, it is likely that the case would proceed. Indeed, a number of early
law suits suggest that considerable flexibility existed in choice of rorum, though
one case for which a record ,urvivcs demonstrates that objection~ to jurisdiction
were lodged and discus,cd.'

' For a rnore full description ,cc John 1/udson, The Forrnation of the English Comrnon
I ,aw ( 19%), ch. 2.
1 ;\_

.I. f?o/Jer/s//11, ed. The Laws of the Kings of England from Edmund to Henry I I 1925),

p. 287.

' II11d1m1, Formation pp. 24 - 7; R. C. Von Co01egrn1, ed., English Law Suits from William I to Richard I, rnl. I, Seldon Society, London vol I 0(1, 1990.
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The charter ignores an array of other courts which were in place by 1100. Perhaps most important amongst those jurisdictions that arc absent arc the ecclesiastical courts. By charter, William I separated lay and ecclesiastical causes, creating a
separate spiritual jurisdiction that was to implement a separate body of jurisprudence:
I therefore co1111naml and enjoin .. that no bishop or archdeacon shall henceforth hold
picas affecting episcopal jurisdiction in the hundred court nor shall they bring forward any
case which concerns spiritual jurisdiction for the judgment or layman: but whoever has
been summoned for some suit or offense which falls within the province or cpi.scopal jurisdiction shall appear at thc place appointed and named by the bishop ... and shall there
make answer ... not according to the hundred court hut in accordance with the Canon
law.<)

Precisely what was encompassed in the 'spiritual jurisdiction' was expressed
therein and came to be refined over the next century. By then, the Church courts
had jurisdiction over a variety of disputes involving both clerics and lay persons.
The most significant areas of lay jurisdiction were controversies over the validity
of marriage and questions of legitimacy. Where cases pending in lay courts raised
such issues, judges were, at least in theory, supposed to refer relevant questions of
law to the appropriate bishop's court for determination according to canon law. In
addition, Church courts also supervised succession to chattels and heard cases involving allegations of defamation.
A second jurisdiction which Henry I's charter docs not mention arc the borough
courts. Boroughs were urban areas or towns that had a recognized degree of legal
autonomy, and in pai1icular developed their own system of courts, procedure, and
custom. 7 Some controversy exists as to whether, at least in a constitutional sense,
the towns of Anglo-Saxon England should be regarded as boroughs. 8 Some sources
suggc:;t that courts were in place prior to the Conquest; other historians seem less
certain. After the Conquest, however, records exist that demonstrate that certain
urban areas achieved a high degree of legal autonomy. For example, the London
Charter of Henry I granted significant freedom to the citizens of London to organize both their economic and legal affairs. With respect to the latter. Londoners
could control the appointment of royal officers who heard picas of the crown and
were allowed to have such cases follow a particular procedure; other disputes were
9
to be heard in their own courls.
Having described in brief the two most important jurisdictions not mentioned in
Henry I's chaitcr, we may return to the three that were: the royal; the shire; and the
Robertso11, Laws. p. 235.
M. Buteson, ed. Borough Customs (Selden Society, London) vols. 18, 2 I. 1904, I 906.
8 Susu11 Rev110/ds, Towns in Domeday Book, in J. C. Holt, ed. Domesday Studies (Woodbridge, 1987 ), pp. 296 - 99; .lames 7c1te, The Medieval English Borough. (Manchester, 1936),
pp. 40 - 5.
6

7

'' Robertso11, Laws, pp. 289 - 90.
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feudal courts. We begin with the royal jurisdiction, the one that is perhaps the most
complex. In the first place, the king in his person was himself an aspect of royal
jurisdiction, as were his courts and his justices. As the fount of all justice, the king
might be asked by an individual to intervene in a dispute. In addition, there were
particular areas or subject matter that came to be the subject of royal jurisdiction.
Moreover, according lo the Lcgcs Hcnrici Primi, the king ·must act a.s kinsman
and protector to all persons in holy orders, strangers and poor people who have
been cast out, if they have no one else to take care or them.' 111
Two processes occurred to strengthen royal jurisdiction: the establishment or the
system or itinerant justice; and the development or the central courts. In the reign
or Henry I ( 1100 - Yi), we find evidence or royal justices in the shire keeping royal
pleas. Originally, the justices may have been sent to the shire for only a single
weighty case, but later in the reign the rcgulari1.cd perambulation of judges called
the 'cyrc' became a fixed part of royal jurisdiction. While it is likely that the practicl'. which we can observe due to the survival of records was not innovative - local
justices might well also have been appointed by the king in Anglo Saxon times the cyrcs of the twelfth century brought royal justice to the shire. During the same
period, royal jurisdiction also found a fixed place to which cases could be brought.
Over the course of the twelfth century and thirteenth century, royal courts, in particular, Exchequer, Common Picas and King's Bench, came to be fixed at Westminster and developed writs, process and procedure to hear an ever-growing number
of cases within the royal jurisdiction: in particular, debt, covenant, and picas invol11
ving freehold land.
In large measure, the growth of royal jurisdiction in the twelfth century came at
the expense of the shire and feudal courts. If at the beginning of the reign or f lcnry
I one might posit three co-equal jurisdictions (royal, shire and feudal) to which
cases were brought based upon common lordship, by the end of the century parity
amongst the courts was not the case. The royal courts became the primary jurisdiction for free tenants even when the king was not their immediate lord. Glanvill
wrote in the reign of Henry 11, "no man need answer f"or his freehold land without
the king's writ"; by that we understand him to mean that unless one had a writ or
right from the king's chancery which ordered the feudal lord to do justice between
the parties, the defendant could not be required to appear in his lord's court to an12
swer the demandant. This principle, royal oversight of seigneurial jurisdiction,
and the creation of writs returnable in the royal courts along with the ability to attack verdicts rendered in feudal courts in royal courts, circumscribed the lord's
ability /and that of his court) to remove a vassal from hi, landholding. 1l Because
111 /, . ./. /)m1·11e1: Legcs Hcnrici l'rimi (Oxford, I ')72J, p. I0lJ. For the origins of tile m,1nu-scriph and spccubtions upon their province and author, sec the Introduction.
11 ½111 Cue11cgc111, Birth of the ComnH>n Law, pp. 20 - 4.
12 c;_ n. (;_ Jiu!!. ed., The Treatise on the Laws and Custollls of the Reallll of England
Conrnwnly called Cilanvill (Oxford, llJlJ:l), p. 148: Vu11 Cuc11cgc111. Birth or the Common
Law, pp. 2'i - 6.
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the principle did not apply to servile tenures. as opposed to freeholds. the f"cuclal
court of the manor continued to have jurisdiction over villein land. the so-called
custolllary tenures; thu, the law of the manor court. the custom which we shall describe below, applied largely to vi llcin land.
Turning to the shire court, and to the hundred comt., below it. these two courts
were the primary jurisdiction in /\nglo-Saxon England. That the charter of Henry I
is concerned with insuring that shire and hundred courts arc properly attended and
kept is testimony to the importance of the shire court. The charter and the tege,1
llcnrici Pri111i lllanil"cst concern as to whether the appropriate personages attended
the lllonthly lllcctings. because the jurisdiction of the shire court went beyond
merely disputes between vassals of different lords, a subject lllattcr which it also
1
lo,;t in the reign of llcnry 11. ·+ The shire court dealt with the adlllinistration of the
county. a lllattcr of the utmo,t interest to the crown and heard less serious land
claillls, those again,! property and theft. When more serious cases came before the
shire court, it rcl"crrcd them to royal justice. /\s the century progressed. land disputes went directly to the royal court; thereafter, the shire court declined in prestige
1
and took on the appearance or subordinate branch or the royal court. '
If the shire court was absorbed gracefully into the royal court. the ,cigncurial
courts faced a more ignominious end. The logic or the J"cudal court was to provide
a forum to mediate rclation,hips between lord and his va,sal,. The greater vassals
met at the honour comt, and the lesser at the manor court or hallllloot. While land
may have been the basis of the feudal relationship and the honour courts convened
to mcmoriali/.c grants of land. the lord also maintained considerable jurisdiction
over offence, against the persons and goods of his vassals. and even over offenses
collllllitted by others on his land, the so called ·,akc and soke' jurisdiction. Such
jurisdiction was solllctilllcs expanded by royal franchise (and so!1letimcs usurped
without royal concurrcnccJ to subject lllattcr normally within the purview or royal
justice. In certain areas of the kingdolll. usually those !1lorc distant from the center
of adl1linistration, London, and in particular, with respect to lands controlled by
ecclesiastical foundations. broader claillls to pervasive jurisdiction wa., clailllcd.
Two trends led to a decline in honour courts. Like the shire courts. expansion in
the royal courts' control over freehold land removed a significant aspect of jurisdiction. Moreover, attempts to circumscribe the claims of lords to franchise jurisdiction which characteri,.cd the reign of Edward I further led to the decline of honour courts. I(, By the last decades of the thirteenth century, the only significant aspect or feudal jurisdiction that remained was over the unfrcc in the lllanor court.
1' h,r a detailed discussion. sec S. /•: C. Mil.w111, The Legal Framework of English Fcllllalisn1 (Cambridge, I <)7(, ).

11

lfllllso11, Formation. pp. :l:i - 7.

15

Nohert l'o/1110; The County Court of Medieval England 1150 - IJ'.iO (Princeton. 1982).
pp. 297 - 303.
'" I)_

W S111ha/mul, ()uo Warran to Prncecclings in the Reign of Edward I (Oxford. I 9<,J).
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The nature of custom
Having set out the structure of jurisdiction in medieval England, we turn to a
consideration of the substantive principles of law produced by and implemented in
the feudal court thal has left to us the most extensive records, the manor court. We
may now turn to our triad of questions regarding manorial custom and make some
progress towards resolving the related queries set out above: in what records can
custom be found; from what source was it derived; and what was the legal nature
of custom? But before doing so, the character of the manor court as a legal institution must be addressed.
At the outset, we must concede that our inquiry is not path-breaking: these arc
not uncharted waters. Over the course of the past quarter century, the manor court
(and by that we mean the thousands of separate and largely unconnected tribunals
which existed in rural England) has come under rather detailed scrutiny by legal
historians, as well as by those scholars interested in the social and economic rela17
tions of medieval society. The records of the manor court are an appropriate
source for both legal history, and for more wide-ranging historical inquiries by social and economic historians, because the manor court's competence greatly exceeded that of an adjudicative body: the manor court regulated agricultural practices; established village by-laws; elected local officials; inquired into disturbances
18
of public order; and monitored payments and services owed to the lord. The manor court was therefore a political and economic entity as well as a legal forum. It
has been suggested, and not without justification, that few villeins did not participate in its business, and fewer still would have avoided allending the regular meet19
ings of the manor court.
The variety of functions that the manor court served rendered it rather extraordinary as a court. Likewise was its personnel exceptional: those who owed suit to
the manor court were mostly villeins. At least in legal theory, though perhaps less
so in practice, the villeins who assembled at regular meetings of the manor court,
the homage, were in law the property of the lord whose steward presided over the
proceedings. This rather unusual relationship between the presiding officer of a

court and its participants has led to considerable skepticism amongst historians regarding the evenhandedness of manorial court proccedings. 20
11

Rud and Smith, eds. provide a useful bibliography of research into manorial courts.

ix For a general discussion, see Lloyd Bonfield, "The Nature of Customary Law in the
Manor Courts of Medieval England", Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 3 I,
pp. 517 - 21: and L R. Poos and Uonl Bonfield, eds., Select Cases in Manorial Courts: property and family law, Selden Society vol 113 (1997) (cited hereafter as Poos and Bonfield,
Cases).
,,, z,,; Ra::i, Life. Marriage and Death in a Medieval Parish: economy, society and demography in Halesowcn I 270 - 1440 ( 1980), pp. I - I0.

20 For a discussion of peasant status see R. H. Hilton, A Medieval Society: the west midlands at the end of the thirteenth century ( 1966): and for a discussion of the legal status of
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Yet too much can be made of this apparent power imbalance, and let me explain
why. If seigneurial interference was linked lo the clement of seigneurial interest,
the lord had no stake in the outc01m: in much of the business which came before
the manor court. For the purposes of illustrating the issue of curial evenhandedness, it may be sensible to divide court business into two spheres: those controversies in which the lord's interest was directly at stake (for example, a dispute over
the extent of" services owed by the tenant of a particular holding of customary land,
and whether the service had been properly perl'ormed): and other cases between
villeins in which the lord's interest was absent (for examples, whether payment
had been made pursuant to a mortgage agreement between two villeins: whether a
promise had been made or whether it had been performed: which villein had the
greater right to possession of a customary tenement). Unfortunately, the universe
of human conduct, at least as it obtained in the manor court, is not so neatly divided. While most cases between villeins probably ICII somewhere towards the lesser realm of lordly concern, seigneurial interest in many such cases was not entirely absent (!"or example, an inheritance custom in which the property might pass
to a woman married to a man not of the homage affected the lord because he would
be required to accept the husband as his villein). It may therefore be more accurate
to regard court business as a continuum in which l"cw issues that came before the
court fell on either end: compelling seigneurial interest, or complete lack thereof.
Though a rough and ready calculus, one might argue that evenhandedness in the
manor court was case specific, and curial influence might be brought to bear to the
extent the lord had an interest in the outcome.
Having categorized the cases in the manor in this fashion, we note that om focus
in this paper will be with disputes between peasants over rights in customary land
and other property resolved by reference to custom, rather than with controversies
between lord and villein over services owed: we shall deal with causes in the manor court on the lesser end on the continuum of lordly interest. The cu,tom which
we shall observe, then, may have been produced with rather modest levels
,eigncurial interference, or at least so our records reveal. Although it was not unheard of in the court rolls for a cause to be submitted to the lord or to his council
for resolution, such reference was cxceptiomll. 21 Manor court juries, comprised of
the villeins themselves, largely presided over the articulation and application of
custom in such cases.
We must also note that the customs which we shall illuminate, like the manor
courts that expressed them, were largely local. Medieval England was comprised
of thousands of manors each with its own court. Theoretically, these courts were
unconnected, and each manor was free to develop its own procedure and customs.
Moreover, there was no regular process of appeal to another court, and therefore
villeins see Pa11/ R. f-lrm11s, Kings, Lords and Peasants in Medieval England: the co111111on
law or villeinage in the lwell"lh and thirteenth centuries ( 1980).
21 l'oos and l!onfidd, c.ds., Cases, no. 4, 49, 114, 174.
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no means existed to harmonize decisions in individual manor courts on similar
questions. Arguably, at least, there were as many ways of handling causes, and as
many sets of legal terminology in which to express custom, as there were manors.
Nonetheless, the records exhibit a fair degree of uniformity. To the historian of
court rolls, there arc certain familiar procedural patterns in which most manors
handled their more routine business: for example, of admitting heirs to their ancestors· property; or permitting one tenant to surrender property so that another tenant
might be admitted; or granting lo widows the portion of their deceased husbands'
lands owing to them as dower or free bench under local custom; or exacting money
from scrvi le women for permission to marry ( mcrchcl ); or as punishment for fornication (lyrcwilc). Even if an individual manor held lo a distinctive custom of inheritance, or expressed the custom in a particular terminology, the records of each
manor court arc on the whole quite similar to those of another.
Having considered the manor court as a legal institution, let us return lo our triad
of questions regarding its custom, and address the first: where was custom expressed'/ The answer to this question is straightforward: in the manor court rolls
(.strips of parchment sewn together in which a scribe memorialized the panoply of
court business in abbreviated Latin probably redacted after the court session from
contemporaneous notes). Custom appears in manorial court rolls in two guises: it
is proffered either in support or the complainant's pica or the dcf"cndant's denial; or
it is pronounced by the jury as a justification of its verdict.
Having said that the court roll is our source for the custom of the manor, we
must concede that an individual court roll docs not, unlike a modern case reporter,
reproduce case after case in which custom is pronounced. To the contrary; manorial custom appears in the rolls only very infrequently. The researcher can scour
herds of sheep' membranes and uncover only a few statements of custom. There
arc several explanations for the dearth or allegations of customs by litigants and
proclamations of custom by the manorial court jury. In the first place, it must be
noted that most or the cases that were formally commenced in the manor courts
went unresolved. Such court business, or course, produced no recitation of custom,
save where the parties pleaded custom to support their claim or denial. The historian, of course, can only speculate as to why a case commenced at not inconsiderable expense to a complainant was thereafter dropped, often with the incursion or
additional expense. Then, as now, a variety of explanations can be offered to account for the many suits that were not pressed to conclusion: from attempting to
achieve the settlement or a tenuous claim through vexation of enemies.
Such suits aside, custom also did not play a role in causes that turned exclusively
on differing apprehensions of factual matters held by the parties. The distinction
between law and racl can be illustrated by considering an hypothetical case where
the eldest son seeks to enter his deceased father's holding. The issue might be one
of fact: I am the eldest legitimate son; and not law: what is the inheritance custom
in a particular manor. Many other cases similarly raise questions of fact: ror exam-
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pie, did a plaintiff alienate entailed customary land;-'" was a piece of customary
1
land leased under condition that the lessee, would not sublet it;:> did a plaintiff's
father make a grant of custo111ary land to the: plaintiff's bastard brothcr' 12 'l
Another reason why the rolls cite custom only sparingly is that those cases that
did reach a conclusion and raised an issue or custom were frequently re,solved by
modes
proof that leave the historian with few clues as to the manor court jury's
logic or with an understanding or custom that may have resolved the conrlict. Wager or law, long a means or resolving disputes in communal courts, continued to be
crnploycd in manor courts into the sixteenth century; the ccrcrnony or oath-making
produces no custom. Moreover, even where a case might be referred to a jury for
resolution, the general issue might have been pleaded: the complainant stated his
claim, the defendant denied it, and the jury round ror one party or the other without
elaboration upon the logic that might support its verdict. Even in cases in which
custo111 had been pleaded, juric.s might determine particular cases without specific
confirmation or denial or a particular custom. Thus in a case where a plaintiff challenged a defendant's entry to customary land on the grounds that the transkr was
against custom, the jury might affirm or deny the plaintiff's claim with a verdict
which fell short or confirming the custom, suggesting (perhaps) that ih verdict
could have rested upon the facts or even upon a different custom.

or

Accordingly, a compilation of rather sporadically articulated customs that resolved cases in the manor court like we have produced might strike the observer as
a litany or oddities distilled rrom examinations or court rolls. /\nd narrowly tailored they might be: for example, should a tenant's eldest son inherit all his land,
or should the eldest son of each or his successive marriages inherit proper(~' which
2
the father acquired during each individual marriagc ": or should a daughter be
barred from an inheritance it' she has been 111arricd with a marriage-portion stemming rro111 the inheritance· 1-'<,
Random though the pronouncements may be, the process of custo111 making discussed above reveals much about the nature or custo111ary law in medieval l!ngland, and provides a basi,s ror compari.son with feudal law 011 the Continent. The
manorial custo111 that can be analyzed by English historians was spawned in the
context of disputes between litigants, and at two points in the controversy: in the
pleading; and/ or in the _judgment. More frequently in our records, custom was expressed by the jury in explanation of ih judgment, though the parties themselves in
so111c causes olTcrcd their own version or custom to support their claim. Moreover.
custom is local, particular to each individual manor.

" Poos and /ionfic!d, eds .. Cases, no. 33.
2.1

Ibid .. Ca~c no. 7).

2.1

Ibid., Case no. 183.

_,; !hid., Case no. I 0.
-'" Ihid., Case nos I <i, 24.
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Manor CllUrt rolls arc the English legal historian's exclusive documentary source
for pronouncements of custom in manor courts in the middle ages, and as such our
evidence differs, at least in part, from sources available to, for example, our h-cnch
clllleagues: there an.: no com pi latiom of customary law that resemble the 1:rcnch
cu.ston1als_.' 7 Manorial law in the middle ages in England sll far as we can tell from
surviving documents was rarely, if ever. systemati1ed in the fashion of French u1stomary law in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Those English customal.s of the
middle ages which do survive arc primarily lists of villein services to be exacted,
rather than catalogues of cu.stoms governing rights or inheritance practices with re28
spect to customary land. Custom in England as it obtained to villein interests in
customary land, as opposed to services due, was largely case speci fie. and can be
found exclusively in the records or litigation. Because custom in England was
rarely redacted and never systcmati1.cd, those principles of custom distilled cannot
he considered a rudimentary code of substantive provisions reu1gni1.ed hy the
111anor court to which reference could be made hy the jury when a case reached
judgment.
Our discussion of where manorial custom is found has led us to our second issue: its intellectual source. If custom is to be found in the pleading and resolution
of causes in the manor court rolls, from what jurisprudential fount did it spring'' 'fo
this question there arc perhaps as many responses as there arc historians who have
cllnsidcrcd the issue. Ci. C. 1lomans was the first scholar to consider this question
in detail, and he did so as an historical sociologist rather than a lawyer. His /:'11gli.l/,
Villogcn in tlic Thirtcc111h Ccnturr 2 'J was an ambitious attempt to derive a jurisprudential theory of customary law by an examination of cases in the court rolls.
On the hasis or hi.s extensive research, llomans concluded that 'lcustomsl must
have hccn developed in the course of a long-continued process of interaction
among many factors'; and in particular. the recurrent e!Tccts of interaction among
individuals, collective pea.sant sentiment, and the nct.:d to further collective enterprise, namely agricultural production and human rcproduction.1° With re.spcct to
the most important aspect or custom. those dealing: with inheritance to land, Homans regarded them as part of the ·mutual adaptation of the institutions of so11
ciety,' part of an elaborate weh of reciprocal understandings that was so comprehensive that when resolving: a complex dispute between parties the jury 'as.serted
that they had rules of custom to apply even in questions as intricate as this. which

-' 7 The Lngli,h kg;tl his1ori;m !llarvels at !he co1mche11sivcncss of, for example. the rnn1pilatio11 of Philippe de lkau1nanoir_ The Coutun1es de lkauvaisis (tr;111s. F N. /'. Akclwrsl)

I I '!92).

-'" For an cxalllplc. ,cc !he co!llpilatio11 of Sussex custrnnah. W /J. l'cck/111111, ed .. Thirtc'l'!l
( 'usto111al, of !he Sussex lllanors of the Bishop of Chichester, Sussex Record Society. vol. .l 1
I l'J2'iJ.
2''

I 1'!41 ).

'" Ibid .. pp. 404 - 7: quotation lrnn1 p. 404.
,i !hid., p. 414.
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can have arisen only rarcly.'-' 2 In Homans' view, even the lord or the manor might
at times be subject to the collective judgment of the homage as if he were being
treated 'much like a11y other villager.'-''
More recently, Homans' view of the nature and origins or custom has bL'Cn challenged. One emerging argument suggests that custom was not spontaneously derived from peasant culture, but rather was greatly influenced by other legal orders:
the canon law of the English ecclesiastical courts and tht: common law or the royal
court. One prong or the argument focusl'.s upo11 procedural changl'. in manor court;
an alteration in thl'. manner in which cases canw bdorc a11d wcrl'. rc,olvcd by the
manor court is stressed and can be summarized in the following fashion. Most legal historians since Maitland have noted that the manor court began to adopt the
procedural forms or the royal court, in particular, the jury or prc,c11tmcnt. Thl'. mils
illustrate that during the first half or the l'ourtl'.cnth L'.entury the manor court wa,
gradually~ again, at a demonstrably uneven pace from manor to manor~ abandoning the practice of compelling the entire homage of all suitors to court to act as the
court's decision-making or fact-finding authority: the rolls indicate that the manor
court was delegating decisions in litigation to trial juries, whose verdicts also increasingly determined cases that might earlier have been settled by wager or law.
Likewise, a growing proportion of the regulatory business of the court came into
the record as the result of declarations by juries of presentment. q Finally, the procedure by which customary land was transferred in the fourteenth century began to
be phrased in terms reminiscent of the common law.
The argument of adaptation of thl'. common law procedure has been extended to
substance, with some historians arguing that, for example, that the cano11 law on
the formation of marriage was assimi latl'.d. y, Other historians suggest that the manor court in areas of private law should be regarded by the close of the thirteenth
century almost as a subordinate branch of the royal court.\(, This view, should it
prevail, dates the disappearance of custom as a discrete though incomplete .set of
functional rules produl'.cd by the manor court (as opposed to a body of law that the
court was to some extent required to adopt) nearly three ccnturil'.s before the manor
courts as dispute resolution forums began to disappear. Arguably, thnc would be

,:: I hid., p. I 90 .
.U

Ibid., p. 323.

These argument;, have been developed in particular by J. S. Hccken11a11, and arc ,urnn1ari1,ed in hi, "'Procedural Innovation and Institutional Change in Medieval English Manorial
Courts,'' Law and History Review, vol. IO ( I LJLJ2), pp. I LJ7 - 252: they arc also disrnssed in R.
M. S111irh "'Some Thoughts on 'Hereditary' and 'Proprietary' Rights in Land under Customary Law in Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Century England", Law and History Review,
vol.I, ( 1983 ), pp. 99 - I 07.
q

\5 R. M. Smith. "Marriage PnJCcssc, in the English Pa.,t: Some Continuities", in /Jowl
Hrmfieid. Riclwrd M. Smirh and Keir!, Wrighrso11 eds., The World We llave Gained: llistorics
of Population and Social Structure ( 198(,), pp. 4:l - 99.
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no conflict between l lomans· notion of cmtom as peasant consciousness and the
position that the Illanor court was assimilating learned law. a, well as procedure. if
it could he demonstrated that the two developmental streams were connected. a
proposition which might be demonstrated if the personnel ol the two courts were
similar. J\s yet no such link has been substantiated.
Tlm.,e histmians who argue for an adaptation of the com1non law by manorial
courts arc not without evidence to support their view. In a number of substantive
area., of family and property law, custom rcselllbled the common law. By this. I
mean that a given rule ( for example. a bastard cannot inherit custon1ary land from
his ancestors) was applied both in manor courts and com111on law courts. Moreover.
in ca.scs in which the issue of illcgiti111acy is raised, manor courts seem to in1plemcnt the canon Lm position on the point at which marriage was lonncd. Yet adoption of co1rn11on law is not always in evidence. There arc also cases in which the
court seems le.ss ,ure of the rule, and one in which they rd'er the niattcr to the lord.
Moreover. problem, exist with the concept of "adoption" or reception. To so argue
it should he neces,ary to pron: that manor courts changed an existing position. It
is not clear what con.stituted ·marriage· in the peasant consciousness. and in the
manor court, prior to the so-called · Alexandrine marriage formation rules': perhaps
there wa., no need to receive canon law beL·ame the peasantry had never required
more formality than trnthplight for a n1arriage to be valid. Thus. that an indi\ idual
principle of custom resemhle.s the eommon law is not necessarily evidence that
custolll has mi111icked com1110n law. Logic might require a consideration ol 1he reverse: to \,hat extent did co1rnrnln law follow principles ol customary law·>
Moreover. the adoption of principles ol common law in a n1anor court 111ight not
always he complete. While royal law might affect manorial custom, reception did
not always mirror con11mln law when righh in cu,trnnary land were at issue. hn
nample. in the ,econd quarter of the fourteenth century. the common law adopted
the principle that illegitimate villeins were of free rather than servile statm. An entry in the court rolls in 1141 of Ingoldmclls in Lincolnshire acknowledged the rule:
1
hcrcartcr, ha,tards in the manor would he regarded as free. ' Yet the court docs not
adapt cu-;tomary land law to the altered view of illcgitiniatc status. ln lngoldmclls.
only villein, could hold customary land, and prior lo the change in common law
principle, \'illcin ha,tards held customary land. though they could not inherit it.
J\ftcr bastards were deemed to he free by the common law. ha,tard villeins were
excluded from holding custontary land by the manor court. even though at common law bastards could hold free land. Thus manorial custom adopted common
law with regard to status, hut did not alter the custom with respect to the ability of
such indi\'iduals to hold rnstomary land. The manorial court refu,cd to yield its
ritd1t to dL'.tcnninc who might hold customary land, and the implications of illegiti111acy dillncd in Ingoldmells depending upon whether customary land or freehold
was at stake.
" /'o//\
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The Ingoldrnclls case provides some evidence to support the l!ornaw,' notion
that custom may emerge from the peasant consciow,nc,s rather than from canon or
royal law. The ·peasant consciousness' in the manor would not allow free persons
to hold customary land. Other evidence or divergence rrolll common law can he
cited. In the rirst place, perhaps Jllost directly, statements can be ltlllnd in the judgt11cnt or manor courts. admittedly uncomnmn, in which the jury asserts that its rule
17
docs not rollow the common law. " Such statements. of course, arc not dispositive
or the question, because royal courts did in certain circumstances permit divergence from the cot11111on law. Moreover, it is al.so .significant that the rorms or action that were required to pursue a cause in the royal court.sand through which the
cornnwn law came to structure legal principles were largely absent in manor
courts, and conspicuously so. The adoption 01· soJllc ol" the procedural rormalitics
or the royal court has been noted above; yet it is cmious that such a rundamcntal
and relatively silllple alteration of the language used to bring business bcl"orc the
court was not adopted if manor courts were adopting substantive law and regarded
themselves as subordinate branches of the royal courts.
We may bridge the gap between a discus,ion ol" the source or custom and its
legal or authoritative nature by considering the runction ol" the court rolls as rncmorials or custom. At the onset or our discussion, we should note that the court rolls
arc only rarely cited when the manorial jury expounds custorn suggesting that juries rarely sought guidance in resolving a dispute by scouring earlier rolls for statcrncnts or custom the way nrndcrn co111mon _judges look to earlier cases ror precedent. Manor court _juries resorted to the rolls far more rrequcntly when issues ol
ract were in need or clarification.
Rarely though not in\'ariably: two cases can he cited in which courts use the
roll, to confirm or to ju,tiry hy ·precedent' its application of rnstom: a case at
Cranl"icld, ,x when the _jury deprived a bastard-bearing heiress or her property hy
citing 'the rolls ol" the preceding court or the manor by record and . . thL' \Crdict
or various inquests'; and also at Burnha111 Thorpe, where the _jury claimed not
to know whether an cider or younger daughter ought to inherit according to the
cu.stom or the manor, and thcrdorc 'the roll or the aforesaid court is to be
searched'. ,,J That the record exhibits kw such cases, and then generally regarding
guidance ract rather than law is not dispositive or the question or the rolls as repositories ol" custom. Yet rare recourse to the rolls ror support suggests that custom ,ccrns to he recorded more as an explanation or _justification fur a particular
decision rather than as guidance ror a future resolution or clairns between parties.
It is arguable, then, that the lack or rdcrcncc to the written record suggests that
peasant legal culture in medieval England was largely oral (or at time.s might
have ,o been) rather than written; and the manor court was able ir need he, as
n:c !hid ..
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Professor .lack Goody notes, to reform its law by forgetting what it had done in
the pas1.·HI
That is not to say that custom once articulated by the manor court jury was not
regarded as binding. There is reasonable consistency in the application of custom.
However, entries can be found of the same manor court reversing itself on a point
in different cases which appear similar (or even in subsequent entries in the same
cause). /\n example is the following case over dower rights. When Richard Panyot
and his wife Denise brought a pica of land against Denise's sister Maud to recover
lands that the sisters' father had died sciscd, and which their mother had held as
free bench in Little Dun mow in Essex, the inquest agreed that as the cider daughter
Denise should ,uccecd according lo the custom of the manor. The court returned
the verdict in favor of the married couple, even though nearly a decade earlier the
court had found that Maud was heir to the same customary tenement because De11
nise had married outside the homage. Although we should not consider the ostensible changing of custom by a manorial court jury (since the court in admitting
Maud in 1328 opined that Denise had no right in the land because she married outside the homage, and later recognized Denise to he the heir regardless of the marriage) as frequent, it is also incorrect to consider custom as immutable. Moreover,
the controversy over whether custom is binding obscures an equally important issue: how did the manor court deal with new legal problems'1 For controversies
might come before manor courts which might be unique on the facts or embody
disputes over rights in circumstances that might have occurred sufficiently infrequently for the community to have likely not recalled its substantive position upon
a detailed question. Take for example, the following case between a tenant's widow and his heir at customary law over dower rights: if a manor's custom dictated
that a widow who was the first wife of the deceased tenant should receive the dccca,cd's entire tenement as free bench, but if a second wife only a cottage and half
an acre, and if a third wife nothing, how often would each generation of jurors be
called upon tu adjudicate the di,putcd claim of a second or third wife against the
42
children of successive marriagcs'1 Indeed this case raised a more arcane point of
law; the issue was not about the particular custom - about which both parties
agreed - but rather about whether the rule applied to 11ll the land of which the deceased died scised, or whether the counting process commence with each .rnccessivc marriage during which the property was purchased. How often indeed.
Legislation might he needed in circumstances in which the jury admitted that it
was unaware of the apposite custom in a dispute. When Robert de Houghton
sought a rncssuagc and half oxgang of customary land in Mcthlcy in Yorkshire
from his cousin on the grounds that the defendant's father was a bastard, the inquest 'questioned as lo which of them should have greater right according to the
111
11
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custom of the manor,' and said that 'they do not know. because this ,ituation never
occurred among them.' The particular conundrum on the question or illegitimacy
at issue in the case arose because the defendant's father had not been considered a
bastard before his death. After admitting the gap in custom, the jury made custom,
rinding for the defendant, and therefore adopting the principle that a person ought
11
not be bastardi;,ed alter his death. To resolve the cause, the jury in Methley was
required, perhaps, to go beyond principles of custom that were probably widely
understood and implemented with some frequency (the definition or illegitimacy,
and its effect on succession to customary land) to circumstances that might be novel, or at least only very infrequently recurring (whether a person regarded as legitimate during his life, hut thereafter alleged to be illegitimate. 111ight inherit). In
straightforward cases. though, one may wonder why. if the custom was so fixed
and apparent to the _jury. the party who lost was not similarly aware or the cu,tom.
In addition to its need to create cu.,tom in unique or infrequent cases, the manor
court _jury was not beyond even more obvious custom making. Some proclamations
of custom certainly smack or law-making rather than law-finding. In a case t"rom
High Easter, for example, the manor court jury confirmed the ability of villeins to
make deathbed transfers as long standing custom_-1-1 That such was the case in the
manor was dubious. In the first place, the steward was himself doubtful about the
practice; and second, no previous examples of such transt"crs were found in the
court rolls. In another case regarding deathbed transfers, this one from Hatfield
Chase, the manor court seems to have extended the circumstances under such
transfer, would be valid. When the villein who had made the transfer i11 c.rlrn11i.1·
recovered and lived for another four years. the court allowed the expression or volition to be implemented (even though the survival rendered the logic of deathbed
transfers moribund) because the court found no evidence that he had changed his
lllind regarding the transt"cr to executors to pay debts. io
Other juries might be more candid in their 'custom making.' For example, a jury
faced with declaring whether a neir woman could inherit neil" property after lllarrying a free man declared that 'whatever they may have concluded ur stated otherwise between other parties, they wish and claim to hold that usage and custom t"orever'; and the new custom was entered into the rolls;-i" Or a _jury faced with deciding the claim or a plaintiff against a cousin who inherited from a bastard might
frankly declare that they did not know who had greater right 'because this ,ituation
never occurred alllong them' before (the court then decided not to declare a villein
17
a bastard after his de,;th).

-1, Ibid., no. 173.
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At times, custom changing occurred with more formality when the homage as a
whole petitioned or otherwise came to agreement with the lord. This process may
imply that major alterations in some manors required seigneurial approval or
acquiescence. In such cases, custom changing may he viewed as more similar to
legislation than to adjudication, evidence or the multifarious role of the manor
court. Homans cited examples or negotiations between villeins and lords to change
a manor's custom of inheritance from ultimogcniturc to primogeniture and vice
vcrsa_-ix
/\!though procedures in the manor court may have been fixed and followed
strictly, we should not remove the manor court from its context; the resolution of
disputes must also he viewed as related to the society it served. By that I suggest
that the court may not have decided cases hy a rote application of custom, even
though the court may well have required strict adherence to its procedure. After all
with respect to flaws in procedure, the offending party often had the ability to bring
the action a second time. There might not be the ability to cure once a substantive
proi1ouncc111ent was made. And because by modern standards ( and even by contemporary ones), the manor court served a rather small universe, the incentive to
reach a just result despite custom must have been great. Litigants frequently must
have known one another: and what is perhaps more relevant, the jury may have
been aware of the merits of the cause, and the relative standing of the litigants in
the community. Under these circumstances, it may have been the case that controversies were resolved a.s much by considering factual equities as the prevailing
custom (that is to say the jury strove for the just result if possible rather than to
follow the dictates of custom if it would lead to an "injustice'). Indeed in some
cases we may regard the dispute as the script of a drama, with the complainant,
dclcndant, and the court with a role to play, the more intricate cases that we have
found rather resemble a dialogue between the parties. The script might even include a role for the court.
Consider. for cxarnplc, the case ol Thomas the son of Robert de Salden, who
prays to enter the mcssuagc and half yard land of customary land in Great Horwood.·1'J There is a tenant in possession hut we hear little or him perhaps because
the complaint is against the lord for admitting the wrong villein. We first meet
Thomas in court on 16 August I
when he sought to he admitted to the land of
his father, alleging his father's possession and his own heirship. It was then found
by the inquest that Robert's father had forfeited the land, and that the lord had admitted another tenant. The inquest confirmed both the fact of the father's ill fame
and the appropriateness or the forfeiture as penalty. About sixteen months later,
however, Thomas was back in court claiming the very same parcels of customary
land, once again alleging his father's right and his status as heir. But he further
pleaded that his father's wife had been admitted to the same land as her dower.
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The homage responded with the same story regarding the forfeiture !"or ill l'allle,
and the lord's subsequent admission of another villein. Robert may then havl'. questioned the appropriateness of the forfeiture (or the jury did so on its own, perhap.s
struck by the probable inconsistency or allowing dower in lands lori"eited by the
widow\ husband), because the circu111stam-cs under which the i"orkiturc occurred
were more fully explored. Was he convicted of a crime'' No. Ii" he gave up the land
voluntarily, presumably by fleeing, was that a ground for rori"citurd The jury, uncertain or custom (and see111i11/c!IY reluctant to declare it), rderred the 111;1tter to the
lord.
The case exhibits a number of themes which we have been cnnsiLkring: till' laL·k
or comprehell';iVL'ness or custom: the difficulty of applying custom to cirn1n1stanccs which occurred only very inrrequcntly: the personal nature of the litigation:
and the desire to achie,·e the just result. Llscwherc, I tentatin:ly sug!c!csted that the
manor court might be better regarded an alternative di.spute resolution Corum rather
than a court. The hostility with which this n1ode'.St suggestion met Crom lllc'dievalist.s must be noted, hut I am still prepared to wonder whether the analogy though
flawed is not entirely unhelpi"ul. I .aw was not necessarily rollowcd: disputes were
resolved. '

11

Conclusion
Thi.s report ha.s addrc.sscd two issues with re'g,ml.s to seigneurial jurisdictions in
medieval England. In the i"irst section 01· the report, the place or seigneurial court.-;
in the array or courts which constituted the legal order in 111edinal England was
set out. The report also pondered the nature or the'. law implemented in the lowe,t
1
rung on the ladder or scigneuri;il jurisdiction.s, the manor court.
Conclusions
must he offered with circumspection given the shear 11u111ber or manor courts
which were determining disputc'.S between peasants in medieval l:n!c!land. I lowc'\'Cr,
our research would suggest a rather broader view ol the variety or rule.s, some c'VL'll
contradictory, which co111prisc'd customary law thus to regard it as a syslc'111 or rulc.s
which cloned the English crnnmon law is mi.splaccd. The 1n;111or court presided
over a jurisprudential order that con,istcd or more than merely rule, regardless or
the origins or their substance. Aside from the principle., or custom, customarv law
consisted or the procedures and rea,oning processes or the various courts and their
juries, suitor.s and officials which resoh-cd disputes. There wa, an accepted set or
disputes cogni1.ahlc in manor court,, an agreed prncTdurc to bring them bcl'orc the
0

'
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•1 It is perlrnps worth noting that tho,,' who owed suit to the' court included tho.SL' holding
l;1nd by custrn11,1ry tenure and in so111e ca,cs those of pe'rsonally unl're'e' status: a1HI ,ince' "lllll'
dispute, or other matter, involving l're·e l,tnd \\'ere hc,1rd ill the' lll,111mial court as well th",e
suitors 111ight include the pcrsrnrnlly free or freehold tenants or the 111anor. er. Mui1/1111il, ed.,
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court, and a process of finding, creating and applying customary norms lo resolve
the controversy before the tribunal. There was no strict uniformity of procedure,
process, or legal reasoning shared by all manorial jurisdictions. Rather, there was
an understanding of how disputes between those who owed suit to the manor court
ought to be resolved. 02

" For a more detailed expression of the arguments herein sec Poos and Bo11fie!d, eds ..
Introduction.

